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Discipline and Punish: Some Corrections to Boyle 
James I. Porter, University of California, Irvine 
This article has two aims: to bring out the numerous misprisions of Foucault contained in a 
recent polemical piece by a contributor to this journal, and then to restate the case for read-
ing Foucault as part of the extended Enlightenment reception of classical antiquity rather 
than as one of its critics.   
 
 ...[A] problem: Is one to involve oneself in polemics and reply to each of these distortions 
and, consequently, lay down the law to readers, which I find repugnant, or leave the 
book to be distorted to the point at which it becomes a caricature of itself, which I find 
equally repugnant?1  
 
Foucault’s originality among the great thinkers of our century lay in his refusal to 
convert our finitude into the basis for new certainties.2  
A reader happening upon Brendan Boyle’s rather jarring critique of two articles of mine 
now some seven years old might feel a mild jolt of a surprise.3  There is more than a whiff of 
crisis in his writing, as if a clutch of disciplines were on the brink of collapse (classical 
studies, philosophy, theory)—though Foucault is well established, his writings keep 
appearing in posthumous and plentiful abundance, and the world meanwhile has moved 
on to other things.  Why defend the fort now?  Indeed, so many charges are massed to-
gether by Boyle and with such a heady vehemence that an unsuspecting reader might 
                                                 
1 Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984, edited by L. D. 
Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1988), 52. 
2 Paul Veyne, “The Final Foucault and His Ethics,” translated by Catherine Porter and Arnold I. David-
son, Critical Inquiry, vol. 20, no.1 (1993), 5. 
3 Brendan Boyle, “Foucault Among the Classicists, Again,” Foucault Studies, no. 13 (2012), 138-56; James I. 
Porter, “Foucault’s Ascetic Ancients,” Phoenix, vol. 59, no. 2 (2005, Special issue: “Interrogating Theory—
Critiquing Practice: The Subject of Interpretation,” edited by W. Batstone), 121-32; James I. Porter, 
“Foucault's Antiquity,” in Charles Martindale and Richard Thomas (eds.) Classics and the Uses of Reception 
(London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006), 168-79. 
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imagine that Foucault had indeed been robbed in his grave, while a more savvy reader 
would recognize that the charges are insubstantial and would guess that there was some 
ulterior motive lurking behind this tempest in a teapot.  Taking nearly twenty pages to re-
but me and the classicists “again,” Boyle worries that classicists have lost sight of Foucault’s 
most basic aims, thereby repeating a lament first voiced by Arnold Davidson in 1994.4  This 
is all very odd: Foucault’s legacy is fairly well sorted out in classics, where he is already 
somewhat passé, yet Boyle seems intent on reliving the culture wars of the nineties—or else 
on fashioning himself after one of his mentors from graduate school.    
 Normally, such an attack wouldn’t warrant a reply, but here the case is different.  In 
his zeal to set the record straight, Boyle does a great disservice to scholarship.  He privileges 
distortion, misstatement, and innuendo over careful scholarship and criticism; he elevates 
uncritical orthodoxy over critical dissent; he privileges sham certainty over sensitivity to 
subtler dynamics; and, in his defense of philology against its purported abuses by philo-
logists, he promotes narrow Wortphilologie (pointless terminological disputes) over deeper 
philosophical and historical argument—a surprisingly retrograde choice, since the field of 
classics has left this dated method trailing in the dust for several decades now.  Boyle's mis-
representation of Foucault is so basic and so widespread that it does have a serious bearing, 
not on my two articles from seven years ago but on the field of Foucault studies.  Though 
legitimate criticism is a crucial part of scholarly discourse, one would expect such criticism 
to be made on the basis of a good grasp of the primary and secondary materials, above all 
where the complex and difficult thought of a thinker like Foucault is in question.  We all 
struggle to make sense of Foucault.  Straightjacketing his meaning into narrow catechisms 
and focusing on minutiae merely trivializes his achievement.  For all of these reasons, and 
given the public nature of his charges, which appear in an online journal freely accessible to 
anyone and indexed by Google, and one of the main venues for Foucault scholarship today 
at that, a reply is warranted.  Foucault deserves better.   
 
*** 
At the heart of Boyle’s polemic lies a concern to protect Foucault from the criticism voiced 
by Hadot and others that Foucault’s project on the ancient self was distorted by its 
insistence on reading an aesthetic dimension into ancient subjectivities. 5   Self-fashioning 
smacks too much of the aesthetics of the self for Boyle’s tastes.  Therefore he must find a 
way to tarnish the term and distance it from Foucault’s intentions.  This he does by gene-
rating a false worry, namely whether “self-fashioning,” “life as a work of art,” and “the 
culture of the self” play a defining role in Foucault’s final project.  For good measure, he 
throws in a second skeptical worry, namely whether Foucault held anything like the view 
                                                 
4 Arnold I. Davidson, “Ethics as Ascetics: Foucault, the History of Ethics, and Ancient Thought,” in Fou-
cault and the Writing of History, edited by Jan Goldstein (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994), 63-80. 
5 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, edited by Arnold I. 
Davidson (Malden: Blackwell, 1995), 211; Boyle, “Foucault Among the Classicists, Again,” 147. 
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that history involves radical contingency.  These are mere quibbles.  Each of the claims 
under scrutiny is widely accepted by all Foucault scholars known to me other than Boyle.  
Foucault’s commitment to an aesthetic view of subject formation cannot be eschewed by 
changing the terms of the debate, while the contingency of history is the premise that 
allows subjects to modify their identities at will, following criteria that are both aesthetic 
and ethical.   
  A second issue concerns Boyle’s distortion of my critique of theorists who claim to 
be following Foucault, theorists who advocate aesthetic self-fashioning either after or à la 
Foucault: Boyle tries to conflate me with the very theorists I am myself critiquing—a 
palpable polemical ploy that does nothing to dissipate what I call the undeniable if now 
slowly fading “Foucault-effect” in the Academy.  Third, in his attempt to legislate what 
Foucault can only ever have meant, Boyle assumes that Foucault’s late thought is mono-
lithic, never evolving, written in stone, and unimpeachable.  It is none of these things, and it 
is a hindrance to understanding Foucault to assume otherwise.  Fourth, legitimate criticism 
of Foucault includes historicizing Foucault’s own contingency, in line with Foucault’s own 
dictates and desiderata.  Foucault’s theory about antiquity interestingly betrays traits that 
are best explained by his inheritance of post-Enlightenment classicism.  To make such an 
analysis is not proof of a personal tastes (“Porter does not like Foucault’s project”).  Among 
mature scholars, criticism has other, higher functions than exhibiting private wants and 
grudges, though Boyle has yet to learn this lesson.  Lastly, a truly substantive engagement 
with my essays would have reckoned with their second major theme, namely that Fou-
cault’s ancients are proto-Christians, and that this historical trajectory in fact captures the 
telos of his genealogy of the modern subject.  In this respect too Foucault is following 
abundant eighteenth- and nineteenth-century precedents in Europe, from the Romantics 
onward.   
 Putting Foucault into historical perspective is the next inevitable step towards 
making sense of his thought.  Foucault’s influence in the Academy is already less imme-
diate than it was two decades ago.  He is becoming less of a catalyst surrounded by acolytes 
and increasingly an object of scholarship (as the present journal illustrates), a feature of the 
larger historical landscape, and indeed a specimen of the classical tradition to which he in 
fact belongs—hence subject to a different set of inquiries, such as reception studies in 
classics, intellectual history, disciplinary studies, and the like.  It is therefore safe to predict 
that dispassionate analysis, or at least rhetoric that is less invested on all sides, will soon 
replace overheated polemics in studies of Foucault.  But now to the individual arguments. 
Words, Words, Words 
Self-fashioning vs. self-care? 
Boyle complains that “self-fashioning” is an objectionable way of rendering Foucault’s final 
inquiry into the “care of the self” because the term “self-fashioning” does not appear in 
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either The History of Sexuality or in The Hermeneutics of the Subject.6  Obviously, the term self-
fashioning is absent from the French originals (my point of reference throughout).  If it is ab-
sent in the English versions, this merely reflects the translators’ choices.  But this is of little 
moment.  What does matter is whether there is any substantive distinction in Foucault’s 
mind between what the two expressions represent, and whether they capture his own idea 
of his project.  And here the answer is plain: there is no reason to doubt the equivalence of 
these expressions, which for this same reason are universally accepted in the secondary 
literature on Foucault.   
 Foucault has dozens of ways of referring to the processes of self-constitution in anti-
quity, early and late.7  All of these are Foucault’s equivalents for epimeleia heautou, cura sui, 
technē tou biou (art of life) and the processes they entail.  Self-modification, self-transfor-
mation, self-displacement, the self’s rendering itself other than itself, working on itself, 
elaborating itself, progressively, etc., are a form of self-fashioning and a form of self-care, in 
any language, which explains why the translator of The History of Sexuality vol. 2 saw fit to 
render se constituer with “to fashion himself”8 and why Dreyfus and Rabinow opted to ren-
der pratique de soi with “self-forming activity.”9  One can quibble all day long about the term 
self-fashioning as a way of capturing these various expressions and their underlying idea.  
Recourse to a simple stipulation, and one that is moreover conventionally accepted among 
scholars in the English-speaking world, nips all such futile debate in the bud.   
 Not so for Boyle, who appeals to examples within Anglophone scholarship that have 
managed to produce “critical but sympathetic” readings of Foucault without, apparently, 
misstating his objectives or misrendering his terminology: for instance, work by David Hal-
                                                 
6 “Why, then, would Porter think that Foucault’s project is a project of “self-fashioning,” given the 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary?” (141) 
7 “Le sujet se modifie, se transforme, se déplace, devienne ... autre que lui-même” in a “travail de soi sur 
soi, une elaboration de soi sur soi, un transformation progressive de soi sur soi” “Bildung,” “Selbstbildung” 
[German for “self-fashioning”]. (Michel Foucault, L’Herméneutique du sujet: Cours au Collège de France, 
1981-1982, edited by Frederic Gros (Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 2001), 17 [delivered in 1982, published in 
2001]); or, if we consult L’Histoire de la sexualité, vol. 3 [1984]: “techniques d’existence,” “maîtrise du 
sujet,” “style d’activité [du sujet],” “intensification du rapport à soi par lequel on se constitue comme 
sujet de ses actes,” “Erwachsenerziehung,” “culture de soi,” “se faire culte de soi,” “souci de soi,” “un sty-
listique de l’existence,” (17; 48; 49; 55; 57; 84; 89; 175) and what in the previous volume (vol. 2) he referred 
to as “arts de l’existence” and “techniques de soi” according to which individuals “cherchent à 
transformer eux-mêmes, à se modifier dans leur être singulier, et à faire de leur vie un ouvre qui porte 
certaines valeurs esthétiques et réponde à certains critères de style.” (L’Histoire de la sexualité vol. 2, 16-17: 
and in translation, The Use of Pleasure: Volume 2 of The History of Sexuality, translated by Robert Hurley 
(New York: Vintage, 1985), 10-11). 
8 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 251. 
9 “...which I call the self-forming activity [pratique de soi] or l’ascétisme—asceticism in a very broad sense.” 
(Foucault,  “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” 265) 
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perin, Martha Nussbaum, and Paul Allen Miller.10  But his appeal is self-vitiating: each of 
these scholars accepts the equivalence that Boyle would deny.11  Has he bothered to read 
them?  Their views are echoed elsewhere across the world in publications on Foucault, both 
among classicists and non-classicists, and the examples can be multiplied ad nauseam.12 
Indeed, one need look no further than the editors of the very journal who found Boyle’s 
piece worth printing.13  
 Obviously, by reaffirming that Foucault’s project was centrally concerned with self-
fashioning I was saying nothing new, and nothing controversial.  Indeed, Foucault confirms 
the claim himself when, in The Use of Pleasure, right after the quotes given above, he ex-
pands on the history of the terms and ideas he has just adopted (and in no way coined)—
namely, “these aesthetics of existence and these technologies of the self”: “It has been a long 
time now since Burckhardt pointed out their significance for the epoch of the Renaissance, but their 
perpetuation, their history, and their development do not end there.” Then comes a foot-
note: 
 
It is not quite correct to imply that since Burckhardt the study of these arts and this 
aesthetics of existence has been completely neglected.  One thinks of Benjamin’s study on 
Baudelaire.  There is also an interesting analysis in Stephen Greenblatt’s recent book, Re-
naissance Self-Fashioning (1980).14  
 
Elsewhere, Foucault happily endorses the “permanent creation of ourselves in our auto-
nomy,”15 sometimes adding “as a work of art.”16  There is no difference between self-
fashioning and self-creation, self-transformation, self-elaboration, and so on—not in Fou-
                                                 
10 Boyle, 138. 
11 Paul A. Miller, “The Art of Self-Fashioning, or Foucault on Plato and Derrida,” Foucault Studies, no.2 
(May, 2005), passim; Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, 
2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2009), xi: “Foucault’s otherwise illuminating writing on self-fashioning in the 
Hellenistic period” (my emphasis); David Halperin, What Do Gay Men Want?: An Essay on Sex, Risk, and Sub-
jectivity (Ann Arbor: Michigan UP, 2007), 7: “Foucault, then, was concerned almost entirely with the techniques 
of self-fashioning.” (my emphasis) 
12 E.g., Rabinow, Introduction to Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, xxiii (self-fashioning names Foucault’s gene-
ral concerns in his unfinished genealogical project); David Halperin, Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagio-
graphy (New York: Oxford UP, 1995), passim; Nehamas, The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to 
Foucault (Berkeley: UC Press, 1998), 104, 179, 183.   
13 See Sverre Raffnsøe, Alan Rosenberg, Alain Beaulieu, Sam Binkley, Jens Erik Kristensen, Sven Opitz, 
Chloë Taylor and Ditte Vilstrup Holm, “Editorial,” Foucault Studies, no. 9, (September, 2010), 3: “Foucault 
shows that we are simultaneously disciplined and self-fashioning selves.” 
14 Foucault, History of Sexuality Vol.2, 11. (appears in an asterisked note).  He is referring to Jacob Burckhardt, 
Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien: Ein Versuch (Basel, 1860). 
15 Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” in The Foucault Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: 
Pantheon). 44. 
16 Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 262. 
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cault’s mind at least, and not in any of his reasonable readership.  Boyle’s insistence that to 
equate self-fashioning with self-care is to offend Foucault’s intentions is simply bizarre.  If 
he wishes to insist on the criticism, he should confront not the classicists again, but the 
majority of theorists who concern themselves with Foucault.  But first of all, he should 
confront Foucault himself.  And finally, he should confront himself: “‘self-fashioning’ never 
departs from the practice Foucault took it to be.  It never, that is, becomes anything other 
than what Foucault describes as epimeleia heautou.”17 
Life as a Work of Art 
Boyle’s philological quibbles are a smoke screen.  Behind them lies another level of objec-
tion: he finds self-fashioning offensive because it recalls too vividly the aesthetic dimensions 
of Foucault’s project, which at times has been critiqued as a form of aestheticism.  The latter 
critique about aestheticism may be off-base, but the fact that Foucault stands in a long 
tradition of inquiry into the aesthetics of the self ought to be beyond dispute.  Foucault tells 
us as much himself when he voluntarily inserts himself into the Burckhardtian tradition of 
the self, state, and society as a “work of art.”18  Boyle’s argument that such formulations as 
“life as a work of art” are “entirely absent from The Hermeneutics of the Subject, and thus 
make for rather scanty evidence with which to reproach Foucault,”19 is both false and spe-
cious.  The Collège de France lectures date from 1981-2, while the interview just cited (“On 
the Genealogy of Ethics”) dates from April 1983.  To take the former as Foucault’s last and 
canonical word is merely an act of desperation, one that is moreover factually wrong.  In 
the Collège lectures, Foucault does use the formulation, as in: “Making one’s life the object of a 
technē—a beautiful and good work...,”20 while he also has at his disposal a long list of equiva-
lents (“art/technique of living/life/existence,” “art(s) of the (care of the) self,” “aesthetics of 
the self,” “working on oneself,” etc.).  As the editorial note (n.14) to page 424 observes, once 
Foucault lighted on the idea of “life as a work of art” and its underlying significance, he 
developed it with increasing tenacity over the next two years—further attesting to the 
dynamic and evolving nature of his thought, which tended to shift its center or centers of 
gravity over time (in this case, rather subtly, to be sure). 21   
 Boyle22 finds the evidence cited for claims about the prominence of the aesthetics of 
self-fashioning in Foucault wanting, but he simply hasn’t read closely enough.23  The same 
interview by Foucault from 1983 has all the evidence one could wish to have, all of it echo-
                                                 
17 Boyle, 142n.11; my emphasis. 
18 See at n.14 above. 
19 Boyle, 148. 
20 Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981-82, edited by Fré-
déric Gros, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 424; my emphasis. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Boyle, 140. 
23 See Porter, “Foucault's Antiquity”, 169 n.3 (citing, Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics”). 
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ing the language of the 1981-2 lectures.  Perhaps the following would suffice: “the principal 
target of this kind of ethics [in antiquity] was an aesthetic one,” viz., “the will to live a beauti-
ful life,” “an aesthetics of existence”; or, “the principal work of art which one must take care 
of... is oneself, one’s life, one’s existence,” “there is only one practical consequence: we have to 
create ourselves as a work of art,” etc.24  If that isn’t sufficient, why not consider the later 
Collège lectures on parrhesia from 1983-4, entitled The Courage of the Truth?  There we read 
statements like the following:  
 
What I would like to recover is how truth-telling [from Socrates onward in antiquity] 
interacted with the principle of existence as an oeuvre to be fashioned in all its possible per-
fection, how the care of the self ... was governed by the principle of a brilliant and memorable 
existence ... [and] how the objective of a beautiful existence and the task of giving an account 
of oneself in the game of truth were combined.” 25   
 
Foucault goes on to gloss this ensemble of concerns as “the question of the true life/aesthetics 
of existence.”26  I could go on listing such testimonies from Foucault, but why take up the 
space?  It seems incredible that one should have to argue for such manifestly indisputable 
and universally accepted facts about Foucault’s philosophy. 
Is Less More? 
One more correction is needed.  Boyle insists that Foucault’s notion of self-fashioning/ 
cultivation/care of the self is not to be confused with an additive process; Foucault only and 
“always” has in mind a subtraction: “When Foucault provocatively suggests making hu-
man life, like a lamp or a house, into a work of art, he has in mind an artistic practice 
ordered around paring-away.”27  Foucault may have this “in mind” but where does he say 
so? On this Boyle is silent.  And rightly so, for two reasons.  First, try to make a lamp or a 
house by paring stuff away.  The very idea is incoherent.  Such objects are constructed of 
multiple parts.  Indeed, they are “multidimensional” objects representing a multiplicity of 
practices and relationships, as Rabinow puts it in his comment on this very image from 
Foucault,28 or as Foucault puts it, they represent an “interplay” of factors, from (on the 
pagan side) appropriations, additions, and unifications of disparate, “heterogeneous” elements 
fashioned into an “assimilative” unity—the relevant metaphors here are incorporation and 
honey-gathering bees, both from Seneca—to (on the side tending towards Christianity) 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 254, 255, 271, 262. 
25 Michel Foucault, [The Courage of the Truth] The Government of Self and Others II; Lectures at the Collège de 
France, 1983-1984, edited by Frédéric Gros, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave, 2011), 
163. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Boyle, 149. 
28 Michel Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. The Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, v. I, 
edited by  Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997), xxxi. 
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abstentions and restrictions.29  Second, if Boyle fails to cite Foucault here by chapter and 
verse it is because Foucault makes no such claims, though Hadot does.  That is why Boyle 
quickly slides from “Foucault” to “both Foucault and Hadot”:  
 
In so doing [viz., in holding this view of self-constituting as self-paring], [Foucault] 
shows himself quite close to Hadot.  That is, for both [sic] Foucault and Hadot the gover-
ning artistic practice for transforming a human life into a work of art is something like 
sculpture, not painting.  It is by paring-away, reducing, and eliminating (all sculptural 
processes) that the human life becomes an ‘art object,’ and not, as Porter implicitly 
suggests, by adding, developing, and expressing.30 
 
Nothing in Foucault is given to substantiate this claim.   
 Two comments: First, Foucault’s idea of subjectivity in antiquity involves a rich set 
of multidimensional practices.  To equate this complex fabric to a process of subtraction 
alone is extremely reductive.  Pagan practices can be assimilative and additive, as we saw 
(“afin d’unifier cent éléments divers comme l’addition fait, de nombres isolés, un nombre 
unique”),31 while renunciation, abstention, self-mortification, and privation increasingly cha-
racterize Christian subjectivity for Foucault.  Nor does Foucault anywhere adduce the Plo-
tinian example or compare the self to a sculptural work of art.  Lastly, I never claimed that 
Foucault understood ancient techniques of the self to be additive or subtractive.  What I said 
was that Foucault’s history of sexuality “reveals the history of the emergence of the ascetic, 
self-disciplining Subject, a Subject that results from the (self-)imposition of a ‘style,’ one that 
entails tremendous constraints, abnegations, denials, and abstentions, what Foucault calls 
‘techniques of the self’.”32  Why does Boyle insist on this distortion?  The answer lies in the 
nature of his polemics, which issues broad critiques buttressed by hedged references (in this 
case, references to Hadot, F. Gros (which proves irrelevant upon inspection), and a 
“suggestion” by Foucault in “What is Enlightenment?” but with no textual evidence to back 
this up).  Which takes me to my second point.   
 The reason for the roundabout nature of these claims—the reason, that is, why they 
fail to connect up with hard evidence either in Foucault or in my own articles—is their 
derived nature.  They are an (unattributed) reenactment of an argument made by Arnold 
Davidson in his essay, “Ethics as Ascetics” (1994), the essay in whose shadow Boyle, all but 
eclipsed, constructs his own, “again.”33  The argument chosen by Boyle ill-suits Foucault be-
cause it was never meant to do so in the first place.  In his own essay, Davidson introduced 
                                                 
29 Ibid., “Self Writing,” esp. 213-214, 221; my emphasis. 
30 Boyle, 149. 
31 Foucault, “L'ecriture de soi,” Corps écrit, no. 5 (Feburary, 1983), 12, or in translation at Ethics: Subjectivity 
and Truth, 213 (where “is formed of” is meant to render “comme l’addition fait”). “Adding” appears fur-
ther up the same page. The original language is from Seneca. 
32 Porter. “Foucault’s Antiquity,” 173; cf. 174. 
33 Boyle, 138. 
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the contrast between self-fashioning as posing or posturing (in the way of a dramatic 
character) with that of the sculptural model, which derives from Plotinus.34  The example of 
Plotinus is, however, not given by Foucault; it is Hadot’s.35  Davidson was, in fact contrasting 
Hadot’s superior conception of self-constitution with Foucault’s, against which Davidson 
was taking a somewhat critical stance, moved by the very sorts of embarrassment that F. 
Gros was seeking to palliate in his own postscript to Foucault’s lectures.  Davidson writes, 
“This [sc., the Plotinian, sculptural and subtractive model adduced by Hadot] is a kind of 
interiorization that aims at transcendence, and if Foucault’s interpretation of ancient ethics 
seems sometimes to border on an estheticization of the self, Hadot’s interpretation insists on the divi-
nization of the self” via a “dilation of the self beyond itself,” resulting in “that cosmic con-
sciousness in which one sees the world ‘from above’”36—a view that Davidson greatly pre-
fers.37  Hadot may have the better of this argument, but that was not relevant to my own 
essay, which is concerned to show how Foucault constructs his view of ancient subjectivity 
on a model of prohibitions, in stark contrast to his own dictates in vol. 1 of The History of 
Sexuality.38  When we come back to Boyle we now see more clearly what is involved.  A cri-
tique of Foucault by Davidson is here being conflated with a view that Foucault allegedly 
held, which then is used to tar another critical reading of Foucault (my own)—or rather, is 
used to tar it by implication, since I never claimed that self-care or self-fashioning was a 
matter of adding to the self.  But that is of little moment, for all Boyle says is that this is what 
I “implicitly suggest[ed],” and from there the author feels emboldened to turn an impli-
cation into a fervid intention: “Porter is keen to foist upon Foucault”—and also, by implica-
tion, upon Hadot (though I take no positions on Hadot in this regard)—the view of “trans-
formation-by-addition.”  Interestingly, the view that Boyle says Foucault and Hadot share 
—in contradistinction to Davidson, his source, who was clear about the difference between 
the two philosophers—is “their picture of epimeleia as the imposition of order on the soul.”39  
And imposition (like “dilation”) is not a kind of addition?  The only real addition going on 
here is happening on the level of polemics, where Foucault and Porter are being supplied 
with claims that neither of them made, so that Porter can appear to be contradicting a 
version of Foucault who never existed.  This is questionable scholarship in the harness of 
polemics, again. 
Culture of the Self vs. Care of the Self? 
Another misguided attempt to split hairs where there are none to split is in Boyle’s in-
                                                 
34 Davidson, “Ethics as Ascetics,” 138. 
35 Ibid., n. 66. 
36 Ibid., 139. 
37 Cf. also Davidson’s introduction to Hadot’s Philosophy as a Way of Life, 24-25: “Foucault made no place 
for that cosmic consciousness.”  
38 Ibid. 
39 Boyle, 149. 
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sistence (couched as expert reassurance) that we should “remember, though, that Foucault 
is not interested, primarily, in culture de soi.  He is interested in souci de soi”—as “the subtitle 
of the third volume of The History of Sexuality or virtually any page of The Hermeneutics of the 
Subject” will show.40  The remark is again unfounded, no matter how one understands it 
(any page? virtually any page?).  The equivalence of the two terms culture de soi and souci de 
soi is abundantly attested in The Hermeneutics of the Subject.41  As for vol. 3 of L’Histoire de la 
sexualité, chapter 2 is simply entitled “La culture de soi,” and Pierre Hadot’s famous critique 
of Foucault in his Philosophy as a Way of Life is entitled “Reflections on the Idea of the ‘Culti-
vation of the Self’” (French original: “Réflexions sur la notion du ‘culture de soi’”).42  Evi-
dently Hadot felt that Foucault’s central “idea” was not what Boyle singles out.43  Pace Boyle, 
no distinction between the two expressions is made by Foucault, because culture of the self 
just is care of the self for Foucault.  Both terms can render l’art de l’existence, technē biou, epi-
meleia heautou, etc.44  Probably the best way to distinguish the terms if one wishes to do so 
(though Foucault is never militant about such axiomatic definitions) is to say that souci de soi 
is the more general phenomenon, and, in a narrow sense, the prior one (under the rubric of 
Platonic epimeleia, though it has later avatars in the same tradition), while culture de soi is 
what effloresces as the intensified, “golden-age” expression of souci de soi at Rome, as a 
genuine culture of the self, en route to Christian practices of the self.45  To claim, as Boyle 
does, that Foucault is interested, “primarily” or otherwise, in the former but not the latter is 
nonsense.  Quite the contrary, it is this very “explosion” and “generalization” of practices of 
the self, made coextensive with an individual’s life in the form of a cultivation/culture of the 
self, that is of paramount interest to Foucault, for it defines the historical arc of his project.46 
The Contingency of History 
One of my critiques of Foucault was that his conception of the subject and of self-fashioning 
is awarded an overly ambitious and not always coherent historical job to perform—namely, 
the task of explaining  
                                                 
40 Ibid., 141. 
41 Compare, at random, Foucault, L’Herméneutique du sujet, 14 (where these two expressions are used 
interchangeably), 32 (I will quote the English, 30: “the period of the golden age of the culture of the self 
[culture de soi], of the cultivation of oneself [cultivation de soi-même], of the care of oneself [souci de soi-même], 
which we can place in the first two centuries A.D.,” on which see also ibid., 502n.21 (English, 548n.21). 
117, 172-4, 427, 477, etc., where culture de soi is used, likewise often equivalently for souci de soi-même; 
Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 232 (“the culture of the care of the self”), 234-5 (care of the self as 
cultivation of the self), 277-278. 
42 Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 206-213. 
43 Hadot’s translator, Arnold Davidson, glosses Hadot’s critique as one that concerns “the care of the self,” 
without fussing over the difference in terminology. (Hadot, 24) 
44 Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité, vol. 3; Le Souci de soi (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), 57-65. 
45 Cf. ibid., 57-58. 
46 Foucault, L’Herméneutique du sujet, 83-4; Foucault,  L’Histoire de la sexualité, vol. 3, 59. 




pagan and postmodern subjectivities; the contingency of all history; historical change, 
conceived as rupture (by claiming that contingency somehow releases subjects from 
necessity); the artfulness of identity (which leaves wide open the question of how to de-
cide what kind or genre of art identity is meant to embody); the history of sexuality and 
the history of subjectivity (while often leaving uncertain which of these two histories is in 
focus at any given moment); and so on.47  
 
That Foucault actually makes such claims on behalf of his project was, I thought, as un-
controversial as labeling his project of self-care and self-cultivation one of self-fashioning.  
Yet Boyle finds these claims of mine incredible, including the least controversial claims of 
all: “the contingency of all history?” he writes, as if astonished to hear this for the first time.  
Perhaps he should read more of Foucault.  Compare “What is Enlightenment?,” where Fou-
cault recommends “a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute 
ourselves,” a genealogical analysis that “will separate out, from the contingency that has made 
us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or 
think.”48  Similar statements appear elsewhere,49 and indeed the principle lies at the root of 
Foucault’s final philosophy.  Historical contingency is the premise of self-transformation: it 
provides the grounds for radical ruptures within human experience.50  Of course, such a 
view dates Foucault’s own theory as itself a product of a historical epoch—that of the 
Enlightenment and then an extension of modernism (on his own reckoning)51 —which is to 
say, it shows Foucault’s theory to be itself subject to historical contingency.  And if Boyle 
were to read around a bit more, he would once again find himself caught out by the scho-
larly community, which echoes Foucault while roundly contradicting himself, e.g. Jan Gold-
stein: “In keeping with Foucault’s own genealogical dictum about the radical contingency of 
history, ...”52  Is there really anything to discuss here?  If one has to defend even the most 
elementary of universally accepted facts about Foucault’s positions, then advanced scholar-
                                                 
47 Porter, “Foucault’s Antiquity”, 169. 
48 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?,” 46. 
49 E.g., Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 139-140: “We have to dig deeply to show how things have 
been historically contingent, for such and such reason intelligible but not necessary. We must make the intelli-
gible appear against a background of emptiness and deny its necessity.” (Ibid., 154) 
50 See Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?,” 39. 
51 Ibid., 39; 43. 
52 Jan Goldstein, Console and Classify: The French Psychiatric Profession in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1987), 411; Further Gutting, “Introduction to Michel Foucault: A User’s Manual” in Gary 
Gutting (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006), 10; Todd 
May, “Foucault’s Relation to Phenomenology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, 300; Alexander 
Nehamas, The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault (Berkeley: California UP, 1998), 169-
70; Colin Koopman,“ Foucault Across the Disciplines: Introductory Notes on Contingency in Critical In-
quiry,” History of the Human Sciences vol. 24, no. 4 (2011), 5: “This is now a classic theme in the literature 
on Foucault.” 
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ly debate can hardly ever get off the ground. 
 Obviously, I did not expect the criticisms that I layered into my description of Fou-
cault’s project to be uncontroversial.  But Boyle seems not to care about my arguments per se, 
only about the way I characterize, or rather (on his view) mischaracterize Foucault to begin 
with.  “Porter does not direct the reader to a place in Foucault’s work in which such a claim 
[about the equivalence of self-fashioning and self-care and their entailments] is made. ...But 
one must remember, however, that this list [given in “Foucault’s Antiquity,”53] is Porter’s 
creation.  Foucault never says anything like it.  Nor does he intimate anything similar.”54  This 
is not an argument; it is a tantrum.   
 Boyle is utterly wrong, and he is contradicted both by Foucault (in the late works 
passim, in addition to his essays on history and genealogy) and by Foucault’s readers.  It is 
alright for, say, Miller to use self-fashioning to describe Foucault’s practice, but not for Porter, 
because Miller “never departs from the practice Foucault took it to be.”55  Criticism of fel-
low scholars here reveals one of its deeper aims: that of playing the part of the thought-
police.  But whose thought is being policed here?  Suppose Foucault thought his practice 
described one thing when in fact it described another.  What is a reader to do?  And are we 
to imagine that Foucault was infallible whatever he thought?  That he never erred about 
what he took his thoughts to be?  Or that his thoughts were never in flux, a work in pro-
gress (which he openly acknowledged them to be),56 obeying different demands of the 
moment, possibly, even—contingent?  
 But then again, which Foucault?  Foucault’s thought is like a moving target: it was 
constantly on the prowl, always shifting and evolving, looking for new formulations, new 
strategies, new ways to shape its images of history.  This is one of the most exciting facts 
about him: he is never dull.  His thought is feathery and complex.  The main lines of his 
intellectual projects can be made out, but he was not an axiomatic thinker: he worked in 
rich, tangled skeins that are vulnerable to various kinds of inconsistency and criticism.  Any 
intellectual achievement worth its salt invites challenges.  Hagiography of Foucauldian 
scripture does him, and ourselves, a disservice.  To assume otherwise is not to read Fou-
cault.  It is to establish a Foucault-catechism.  And woe to the reader who strays from the 
sacred path! Discipline and Punish, indeed.57  
Confusions: Foucault and the Foucault-effect 
Foucault, I say, created a “Foucault-effect” in the Academy, which is to say he encouraged a 
trend that celebrated self-fashioning subjectivities in different domains (sexual, philoso-
                                                 
53 Porter, 169; quoted p. 189 above.  
54 Boyle, 140. (my emphasis) 
55 Ibid., 142n.11. 
56 E.g., Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, 251. 
57 “But even here, when Porter’s criticism is on roughly the right track, it is formulated in a manner that 
cannot go uncorrected.” (Boyle, 149) 
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phical, subaltern, etc.) whose exponents, I further suggested, beyond discovering some 
liberating elements in his reading of the ancients, overlooked numerous complications in 
Foucault’s own project.58  These spin-offs of Foucauldianism must have found something to 
profit by in Foucault’s obsessions with antiquity: why else would they care to read about 
Epictetus and Augustine if their objectives were not antiquarian but were located in the 
present? Here, self-fashioning often comes to signify “a kind of self-creation, free from all 
forms of necessity and constraint.”59  But this is not how Foucault characterizes the ancient 
forms of self-fashioning or self-cultivation, at least not most of the time, nor is it how I 
described Foucault, pace Boyle.  In “Foucault’s Antiquity” I describe such techniques in the 
following way: “the classical model of self-production, the Greek and then Roman ‘art of 
life’ (technē tou biou), which is the art of ‘exercising a perfect mastery over oneself’ – in other 
words (which are Foucault’s), an ‘aesthetics [and ‘ascetics’] of existence’ freely constructed 
within a system of relations of power that are enabling and constraining at one and the same time.”60  
Further, I state, “subjects aren’t freed by self-fashioning; they are subjected to severe and austere 
constraints, which are the conditions of their birth and existence as subjects.”61  In his rendi-
tion of my arguments about Foucault, Boyle lops off all mention of constraints and power 
relations that form the cadre within which subjectivity can emerge at all.  Having distorted 
my characterization of Foucault in this way, he goes on to conflate it with my characteri-
zations of Foucault’s postmodern adoptees, as if I had conflated these myself.  And finally 
he reduces these last characterizations to a caricature (“a ‘Californian’ form of narcissism”) 
to which I am made to assent, which then boomerangs back to Foucault again: “Porter’s 
Foucault, then, sounds very much like the interviewers’ narcissist.”62  Alas, this statement 
does not reflect “my” Foucault or anything else I said in my articles; it is a confection of 
Boyle’s own making.  Foucault, as I read him, is not a Californian narcissist.  He is, on the 
contrary, all too fascinated with Christian ascetic practices and their precursors among the 
pagan cultures of Greece and Rome (see below).    
Foucault’s Own Historical Contingency 
Boyle is so intent on foisting arguments on me that I never made or intended, and on ma-
king distinctions that he does not fully control himself, that he utterly fails to grapple with 
the real thrust of my articles.63  Rather than rehearse these all over again, I will simply men-
                                                 
58 Porter, “Foucault’s Ascetic Ancients,” 123. 
59 Boyle, 142. 
60 Foucault, “Foucault’s Antiquity,”121. (my emphasis) 
61 Ibid., 125. (my emphasis) 
62 Boyle, 147. 
63 Symptomatically, he states that though there is “some difference in emphasis” between the two essays, 
“I don’t think that [this] affects the argument” of his own essay (139n.3). Obviously not if one is un-
concerned with the different substantive issues raised in each essay but only with a more indiscriminate 
kind of polemics.  The present section touches on the main theme of Porter, “Foucault's Antiquity,” and 
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tion two of my arguments that are more relevant to Boyle’s problematic understanding of 
Foucault, in quick succession.  The first has to do with contextualizing—historicizing—Fou-
cault, something that no Foucault catechism can allow for, but which any reasonable critical 
scholarship must endeavor to do.  Foucault not only accepted the contingency of history, he 
was also aware of the fact of his own historical contingency.  Thus, in “What is Enlighten-
ment?” (1984), he writes, “we must try to proceed with the analysis of ourselves as beings who 
are historically determined, to a certain extent, by the Enlightenment.”64  He also seems to recog-
nize, in the same essay, that his own method of inquiry and the very problem it presup-
poses are themselves the product of the Enlightenment: “I have been seeking, on the one 
hand, to emphasize the extent to which a type of philosophical interrogation—one that 
simultaneously problematizes man’s relation to the present, man's historical mode of being, 
and the constitution of the self as an autonomous subject—is rooted in the Enlighten-
ment.”65  
 My point, especially in “Foucault’s Antiquity,” was to illustrate some of the many 
unnoticed ways in which Foucault’s project of reclaiming a model of the self from antiquity 
was precisely an inheritance of the modern Enlightenment, most likely thanks to the offices 
of Nietzsche (whose complex views of ancient selves are thinned out on Foucault’s reading 
of genealogy).66  Bildung and Selbstbildung, used by Foucault in his L’Herméneutique du sujet67 
as a way of naming souci de soi, epimeleia heautou, la formation du soi, and culture de soi, etc., 
are only two of the most recognizable clues to this inheritance.  The aestheticized nature of 
self-formation in antiquity as Foucault understands this, and which Hadot, Davidson, and 
others have justly highlighted, is one more index of this same inheritance.  Inserting 
Foucault into the—for Foucault, decidedly German—Enlightenment tradition, which runs 
from Humboldt and Winckelmann to Burckhardt and Nietzsche, is a fruitful way of 
contextualizing Foucault’s intellectual inheritances: it gives them a much-needed contour.  
Not the least of the benefits of reframing Foucault’s final project is that it allows us to 
perceive the various elements of classicism that inflect his reading of Greece and Rome.  
Foucault does not stand outside of the classical tradition like some objective watchtower or 
Olympian deity.  He is an active part of that tradition, and one of its most recent exemplars.  
He has also, of course, had an indubitable impact on the Academy, most significantly 
inspiring areas and even fields of research where none existed before, and elsewhere 
inspiring what I have called “the Foucault-effect.”  This latter includes the writing and 
thinking of Judith Butler, Richard Rorty, David Halperin, and Alexander Nehamas (to 
                                                                                                                                                             
the next that of Porter, “Foucault’s Ascetic Ancients.” 
64 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?,” 43. (my emphasis). 
65 Ibid., 42. 
66 On which, see now James I. Porter, “Nietzsche’s Genealogy as Cultural Critique,” in Ruth Sonderegger 
and Karin de Boer, eds., Conceptions of Critique in Modern and Contemporary Philosophy (London: Palgrave, 
2011), 119-36. 
67 Foucault, L’Herméneutique du sujet, 45-46; 60n.4. 
Foucault Studies, No. 14, pp. 179-195. 
193 
 
mention only those most prominently discussed in my 2006 article), who develop theories 
of self-fashioning while also reflecting Foucault’s influence to a greater or lesser extent.68  
But increasingly Foucault’s effect is waning: he is becoming more or less a historical pheno-
menon rather than a front-page item in the daily news. 
 Once Foucault’s place within history is acknowledged, a better grip on his project 
will be possible.  He will no longer appear like a messiah, a prophet, or a personal trainer, 
and will henceforth take up a position alongside other historical figures from the past.  His 
thought won’t primarily be channeled by partisans; it will be studied by scholars in classical 
reception, intellectual history, philosophy, sociology, and other fields who are keen to clar-
ify, and not sanctify, Foucault’s achievements.  This approach to Foucault was, after all, the 
way I began “Foucault’s Antiquity,”69 which appeared in a volume devoted to classical re-
ception.  There is much more valuable work in this same vein awaiting to be undertaken.    
Foucault’s Ancients as Proto-Christians 
The second of my arguments was a more controversial one.  It had to do with the palpable 
fact that Foucault’s genealogy of the modern subject traces the rise of a subject of prohibi-
tions and constraints, produced by a regime of harsh, self-, or rather culturally and socially, 
imposed austerity and self-invigilation.  The theme is delicately traced in Foucault.  That is, 
he hedges his bets on the actual continuities that underlie the pathways that lead from pa-
gan antiquity to Christianity, at times emphasizing these, at other times playing them down.  
I believe we get a good sense of the fundamental trajectory of this aspect of his project in 
such statements as the following:  
 
Christianity is usually given credit for replacing the generally tolerant Greco-Roman 
lifestyle with an austere lifestyle marked by a series of renunciations, interdictions, or 
prohibitions.  Now, we can see that in this activity of the self on itself, the ancients deve-
loped a whole series of austerity practices that the Christians later directly borrowed 
from them.  So we see that this activity became linked to a certain sexual austerity that 
was subsumed directly into the Christian ethic.  We are not talking about a moral rupture 
between tolerant antiquity and austere Christianity.70  
 
That is, Foucault went back to pagan antiquity in search of the origins of the modern self, 
and found, I believe much to his surprise, the origins of the self-disciplining, self-con-
stituting Christian self.  Indeed, if Foucault’s gaze repeatedly returns to the first few cen-
turies of our era at Rome, this is because it is here he believes that the ancient culture of the 
                                                 
68 Evidently I am not alone in pursuing this interest.  See R. Lanier Anderson, and Joshua Landy “Philo-
sophy as Self-Fashioning: Alexander Nehamas’ Art of Living: The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from 
Plato to Foucault by Alexander Nehamas,” Diacritics, vol. 31, no. 1 (2001), 25-54. 
69 Porter, “Foucault’s Antiquity,” 168-69. 
70 Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” 271. 
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self finally comes to fruition at all.71  “Antiquity,” he says (a term that is provocatively 
vague—it essentially sums up the essence of all that precedes modernity, but includes the 
Christian era and Christian practices), “never stopped posing the question of whether it 
was possible to define a style common to these different domains of conduct [viz., as per-
tained to truth, power, and individual conduct].  In fact,” he continues, 
 
the discovery of such a style could probably have led to a definition of the subject.  The 
unity of a “style of morality” began to be thought of only during the Roman Empire in 
the second and third centuries, and it was thought of immediately in terms of code and 
truth.72 
 
This was the Roman achievement—the discovery of a uniform and universalizable style of 
subjectivity.  Everything hitherto was mere anticipation and stumbling: 
 
[The Greeks] immediately stumbled upon what I consider to be the contradiction of the 
mortality of antiquity between the relentless search for a certain style of existence on the 
one hand and the effort to make it available to all on the other.  While the Greeks pro-
bably approached this style more or less obscurely with Seneca [sic] and Epictetus, it 
found expression only within the framework of a religious style.  All of antiquity seems to me 
to have been a “profound error.” [Laughter]73 
  
When he looked ahead into the early modern period during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, Foucault saw more of the same: a “reactivation of these ancient techniques [in-
herited from the Stoics] in the form of Christian spiritual practices.”74  And when he pon-
dered the historical fate of the still later modern subject and how it stood in relation to the 
classical culture of the self, Foucault decided that this earlier culture of the self never “dis-
appeared or was covered up.  You find many elements that have simply been integrated, 
displaced, reutilized in Christianity,” though it also “lost a large part of its autonomy”75—
inevitably so, as it was harnessed to a larger cultural mechanism.   
 Whether the ancient culture of the self ever enjoyed the autonomy Foucault here 
appears to credit it with is disputable.  To the extent that it did, Foucault’s claim is that it 
produced subjects who stood out from their culture like decorations, as works of art.  But 
                                                 
71 Cf. p. 188  at n. 46 above on the “explosion” and “generalization” of practices of the self. 
72 Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, 244. 
73 Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, 244; Cf. Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 320: “The difference be-
tween paganism and Christianity should not be characterized therefore as a difference between a Christi-
an ascetic morality and a non-ascetic morality of Antiquity. You know that this is an utter fantasy. 
Asceticism was an invention of pagan Antiquity, of Greek and Roman antiquity.” Cf. “On the Genealogy 
of Ethics,” 270-71. 
74 Ibid., 276. 
75 Ibid., 278. 
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art is of course never an autonomous entity, any more than individuals or subjective 
practices are.  They may produce the illusion of autonomy—of resulting from free choices, 
self-willed acts, and autonomous agency, all of which Foucault set such great store by, not 
only in his desiderata for “us today” (in the name of “the constitution of ourselves as 
autonomous subjects,” of the “permanent creation of ourselves in our autonomy,” and of the 
“work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings”),76 but also as reflective of, and 
even continuative of, the ancient cultures of the self, which he felt operated on identical 
principles77—astonishingly so, because to attribute such freedoms to the ancient Greeks is to 
flirt, at one and the same time, with a retrojection of modern concepts (especially Kantian 
and post-Kantian ones), nostalgia, voluntarism, and self-contradiction.78 I say self-contra-
diction, because it’s not at all clear what it would mean to return to such a picture of the 
ancient Greek self while also holding onto a historical trajectory in which that self is 
destined to become Christian—indeed, is already groping its way towards an unfree, 
prohibition-based Christianity, and with such overwhelming tenacity that it warrants being 
labeled “proto-Christian.”  That fantasy—of Greeks presenting themselves in the guise of 
(proto-) Christians—is as much an inheritance of the German Enlightenment and the later 
nineteenth century as is the fantasy of free-wheeling Greeks appearing in the guise of 
autonomous works of art.79  But excavating more fully this facet of Foucault’s final profile 
must wait for another occasion. 
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76 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?,” 43, 44, 47; my emphasis. 
77 Foucault, “the subject’s free and rational choice,” History of Sexuality vol. 3, 64; Cf., e.g., Foucault, Poli-
tics, Philosophy, Culture, 247: “It is important to ... show how the same advice given by ancient morality 
can function differently in a contemporary style of morality”; see also ibid., 248. 
78 See Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, 249: “The point is rather to see to it that European thinking 
can take up Greek thinking again as an experience which took place once and with regard to which one 
can be completely free.” 
79 For relevant background, see now Miriam Leonard, Socrates and the Jews: Hellenism and Hebraism from 
Moses Mendelssohn to Sigmund Freud (Chicago: Chicago UP, 2012). Nietzsche, incidentally, did not fall vic-
tim to this fantasy. He ridiculed it. See James I. Porter, Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future (Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 2000), 220-24 with 380n.177 (“Vorahnung des Christenthums in der Antike,” “anticipation of 
Christianity in antiquity”).  
